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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This review of the justification for discriminatory excise taxes concludes that the economic
case for taxing soft drinks is weak. In developing economies, expenditure needs are great, tax
administration is weak, and countries may resort to discriminatory excise taxes as stopgap measures
to solve short-term problems. More advanced economies do not have to settle for such stopgap
measures. Discriminatory excises, other than on the “sin” products, find little justification in
modern tax systems. In fact, discriminatory taxes on soft drinks have been eliminated in most
European countries and are recommended for elimination in the EU. A middle or higher income
country that resorts to a tax list of discriminatory excises on consumption of specified products is
taking a step back in the development of their fiscal system and is postponing a more proper reform
that would be in the better interest of the country.

ii

WHY LEVY DISCRIMINATORY EXCISES ON SOFT DRINKS?
Roy Bahl*
Why would any country impose a discriminatory excise tax? Are there conditions under
which such measures can be justified as good public policy? What are the revenue implications of
special excises, and how widespread is the practice? Are soft drinks a particularly good candidate
for discriminatory tax treatment in the name of increasing the national welfare? The answers to
these questions are integral to evaluating the question of whether a discriminatory excise tax is a
wise tax policy choice.
This paper gives an overview of the justifications for special excises of soft drinks, based
on standard economic analysis, the literature, and expert opinion in taxation. This review
concludes that the economic case for taxing soft drinks is weak. Due to revenue needs and
weaknesses in tax administration capacity, some developing countries impose excise taxes on soft
drinks. But such taxes are “second-best” policies, and it would be far better if these countries
adopted broader-based excise or sales taxes that do not discriminate against particular products.
As countries graduate along the development ladder, the apparent need for such practices
disappears. The need to compensate for a poor tax administration gives way to fairness in taxation
and economic efficiency as the driving forces behind tax reform. There is little justification for
discriminatory excises on products other than those imposing significant external effects, such as
alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, and motor fuels. One European public finance expert has put it
well, “Almost all countries impose special taxes on alcoholic drinks, tobacco, motoring, and
betting. But the reasons why Anglo-Saxon Countries have penalized mechanical

* Professor of Economics and Dean, School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
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lighters and playing cards, and continental European ...(countries have penalized) tea, coffee and
sugar, are mostly hidden in the mists of time.” (Kay, 1990, p. 40).

THE NEUTRALITY CASE AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY TAXES
To most fiscal economists, good tax policy begins with the rule of neutrality, i.e., in the
absence of “market failure” the tax rate and base structure should not interfere with consumption,
production or investment choices. Though no tax regime is perfectly neutral, the more broadbased it is, the closer it moves toward the goal of taxing all consumption and production activities
at the same effective rate. Under broad-based and flat rate taxes, economic decisions are
influenced more by the conditions of the market and less by the tax rules.
Special excise taxes are the textbook example of how to violate the rule of neutrality. By
raising the price of the taxed good relative to other goods, special excises bias consumption away
from the taxed product. Consumer choices are thus distorted by the tax system, and the national
welfare is harmed. This is the traditional thinking that has led most tax policy analysts to hold to
Adam Smith’s original maxim of neutrality and to argue for broad-based and non-discriminatory
taxes.
In fact, many countries impose discriminatory taxes, with liquor, beer, cigarettes, motor
fuels, and various kinds of luxury consumption being the usual targets. One might ask the obvious
question: If special excises are such a bad idea, then why are they so often used as an instrument
of tax policy? There are a number of answers to this question.1 One is that there are conditions
under which special excises can be justified as in the national interest. Another answer is that
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The traditional justification for special excises is presented well in Tanzi (1995, pp. 56-64). For a more detailed
discussion, see Cnossen (1991, 1998).
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special excises are politically feasible by comparison with the other tax choices available. Finally
there are justifications for tax structure choices that are completely outside economics and politics
-- such as reaching for the moral high ground -- and discriminatory taxes might be justified by
such considerations. Most advocates of special excise taxes fall in one of these camps, and they
usually argue one of the following five points in advocating discriminatory taxes.

COMPENSATION FOR EXTERNAL COSTS
The best economic justification for a discriminatory excise tax is that the additional tax is
needed to compensate for an external effect related to the production and/or consumption of
“undesirables”. For example, the consumption of cigarettes imposes health risks to smokers and
to those who are around smokers, productivity losses to workers and therefore to the economy,
and health care costs on society. The consumption of liquor increases the cost to society in the
form of increased automobile accidents, drinking related crime, and the maintenance of alcohol
abuse centers. Gasoline consumption is associated with increased levels of air pollution, increased
congestion and increased highway expenditures that must be financed by others.
Somehow, the consumers and producers of the offending products should pay these
external costs. An excise tax imposed on production or consumption of these items is meant to
compensate society for these externalities, though revenues often are not adequate in amount.
Consumers of alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline, for example, are required to pay a price for their
consumption that reflects not only the value they place on the good, but also the cost they impose
on society.
The externality justification, however, does not easily fit the situation of soft drinks.
Consider the merit of the three principal arguments that soft drinks impose external costs that
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should be compensated with a special tax. The first has to do with who should pay the
environmental cost of aluminum, plastic, and glass containers that are not recycled, and who
should pay for the share of recycling cost that is now borne by government. On the one hand,
there can be little argument other than that consumers of soft drinks should bear their fair share of
these costs, and an excise tax would seem to be a possible approach to recouping this cost. On the
other hand, the share of containers generated by the carbonated beverage industry is relatively
small. Other consumer good industries, therefore, should be subject to a similar tax based on their
potential waste and recycle cost. Clearly, it would be infeasible to administer a differential excise
tax for each industry, depending on their contribution to environmental problems. A special excise
tax levied only on carbonated beverage consumption can hardly be justified on these grounds.
The second externality argument is that soft drinks require government monitoring of
packaging and labeling, and this imposes a cost for which taxpayers should be compensated.
Again, the issue is that many other consumer goods require the same degree of monitoring.
Simply put, special excises are not the answer to compensating society for external costs of
government monitoring of labeling and packaging.
Third, there is the point that carbonated beverages are a mixer for alcoholic drinks, and
that a special excise tax would therefore discourage liquor consumption. This argument would
seem to be a significant stretch, and has not been convincing to government fiscal planners in
most countries or to the EU. Many have argued that soft drinks should be viewed as a substitute
for alcoholic beverages, not as a complement to them.
The more general view is that soft drinks do not impose a social cost on society in the
form of health risk, in the inducement of aberrant behavior by those who consume soft drinks, or
by requiring special costly public infrastructure to meet the needs related to increased soft drink
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consumption and production. In short, a discriminatory tax on soft drinks is not justified on
economic efficiency grounds.

IMMORAL BEHAVIOR
A special excise tax may be levied for “moral” reasons. Drinking and smoking are seen by
some as immoral activities that ought to be discouraged, and higher taxes are imposed to raise the
price of these activities in hopes of curtailing consumption. This argument is based on
philosophical views rather than economics and cannot be evaluated using economic theory.
However, it is difficult to see how the consumption of soft drinks would offend national
sensibilities.

REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Another argument is that the government fears production and consumption of nonessential goods and services will “crowd out” more productive uses of resources in the economy.
A much better allocation of resources, some would argue, is heavier investment in capital
intensive, export oriented industries. To discourage the investment in activities such as cigarette
or liquor production, governments often adopt discriminatory taxes that discourage domestic
consumption or domestic production, or both. Government planners also make other disfavored
activities the target of discriminatory taxes. For example, it may be desired to discourage luxury
consumption in favor of increased savings, or to discourage the consumption of foreign-produced
luxury goods in favor of consumption of domestically produced goods.
There are many questions to raise about such a justification for special excises. First, it
substitutes administrative decisions for market signals about what production is “best” for the
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economy, and raises the more general question about the extent to which the economy will be
planned or market driven. Second, if tariff protection is part of this discriminatory tax regime,
inefficiency in domestic production may be encouraged, and fundamental reforms in economic
policy may be delayed or postponed. Third, such policies require governments to identify “degrees
of luxury” and to tax various consumer goods accordingly.2
To use this justification for a discriminatory tax on soft drinks would require one to
believe that resources are being siphoned from other more productive sectors, and to believe that
increased soft drink production does not increase value-added tax in the economy. This would be
a difficult case to make in countries, as soft drink production shows a high domestic value-added
component, can produce an excess of exports over imports, and has positive employment
impacts.3

REVENUE YIELD
The government may levy the specific excise simply to increase its revenues. The rationale
is straightforward. The typical targets for special excises are thought to be price inelastic in
demand, which means that government can raise the tax rate and realize a significant revenue
increase. Consumers cannot find good substitutes for these products, and therefore maintain

2

For discussions of this issue, see Tanzi (1991, Chapters 8 and 10), Bird (1992, Chapter 9), and Due (1988,
Chapter 4).
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One might also note a balance of payments effect. The soft drinks association estimates total exports for 1995 at
about 21 million liters and total imports at about 60 million litres. Total domestic production was 276 million
litres.
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something close to their pretax consumption level. Gasoline, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and
some luxury items are widely believed to fit this profile.4
Because governments are ever strapped for resources to support their expenditure
programs, special excises have long been a favored target when budgets are tight. “Why not let
smokers or luxury consumers finance a share of the budget deficit,” is a sentiment that resonates
well with voters. An increase in the tax rate on gasoline or beer is a “quick revenue fix” because
the collection machinery is already in place, and the money can begin to flow quickly. Increased
taxes on drinking, smoking and luxury consumption are less dangerous in the eyes of a voteseeking politician than are rate increases on the broad-based taxes.5 Do soft drinks, still subject to
discriminatory taxes in many developing countries, carry these same advantages? That is, are
excise taxes on soft drinks acceptable to voters, can they be easily collected at reasonable
administrative cost, and is the demand price inelastic?
It is true that, with respect to political acceptability, it was finally good economics and EU
harmonization efforts rather than taxpayer outcry that brought on the abolition of the
discriminatory excise duties in many European countries. Soft drink producers are always
unhappy about discriminatory treatment, knowing that their products sell best when prices are
kept low and on par with those of competing products. A possible reason for the absence of vocal
taxpayer opposition is that soft drink taxes often are not directly collected from consumers. Most
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McLure and Thirsk (1978) find evidence of price inelasticity for cigarettes and liquor in their review of the earlier
literature.
5

Increased motor fuel taxes may be a different story, especially in developing countries where tax increases have
led to riots in the past.
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taxpayers may not fully realize the extent to which the tax has increased the price of the beverage,
thus making excise duties “invisible”.6
With respect to administrative costs, a special excise tax on soft drinks is relatively easy to
assess and collect. However, a separate levy on soft drinks will require the establishment of a
separate department (probably within the customs and excise department), and will increase the
compliance cost of those who are liable to pay the tax. Given the small yield of this tax in most
advanced countries, this would seem a cost easily avoided. It could be argued that a marginally
higher rate on the general sales tax, where the administrative machinery is already in place and
where firms must already comply, is a better way.
The biggest difference between soft drinks and other subjects of special excises, however,
may be the price inelasticity assumption. The demand for soft drinks is more price elastic than has
sometimes been supposed, precisely because there are good substitutes and because many of these
substitutes are subject to differential tax treatment. Consider how a family might react to a taxinduced increase in the price of soft drinks. If there are good drink substitutes subject to different
tax regimes, e.g., coffee, tea, water, juices, syrups, tap water, etc., the family might react by
consuming more of the substitute.

There also are a great many choices of non-alcoholic

beverages, and it is not uncommon for many of these to be subject to a lower tax rate.7 If soft
drinks are partly consumed as a general entertainment good, they may be replaced by higher
spending on movies, ice cream, etc., if the relative price of soft drinks gets too high. As has been
6

A poll conducted in The Netherlands in 1992, however, showed that most consumers strongly disagreed with the
imposition of this tax.
7

In a recent review of the soft drink industry in the European economy, Canadean (1997) suggested the wide range
of consumer choices available. In a supermarket in Britain, there are 450 “buying options” for non-alcoholic
beverages. Using a similar measurement method, they estimate that there are 320 in Belgium, 480 in France, 500
in Germany, 235 in Netherlands, 250 in Spain, and 170 in Italy.
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shown with data for Ireland, the demand for soft drinks is price elastic because there are good
substitutes available at different prices (Bahl and Walker, 1998). We are led to the conclusion that
consumers will move to substitutes if discriminatory taxes are imposed, and will increase their
consumption of soft drinks if discriminatory taxes are eliminated. In the latter case, the increased
consumption will significantly cushion any revenue loss occasioned by a tax elimination.

EQUITY JUSTIFICATIONS
One notion of equity is that higher income families should pay a greater proportion of their
income in taxes than should lower income families. Special excises on luxury items, therefore,
might be justified on grounds that they are a progressive and (some would say) an equitable form
of tax. However, while soft drink consumption generally rises with increases in total and
discretionary income, tax progressivity is not a justification for discriminatory taxation of soft
drinks. This is because soft drinks are but one of a host of goods and services whose consumption
rises as income levels grow, and any of these goods could be equally attractive targets for
taxation. Moreover, a tax on soft drinks is unlikely to impose a burden large enough to
significantly change the overall degree of tax progressivity.
There is another dimension to equity that clearly argues against discriminatory taxation of
soft drinks. Horizontal equity in taxation requires that equally situated individuals be treated the
same by the tax system. Special excise taxes on soft drinks do not pass the horizontal equity test,
because all individuals who buy a drink are not treated the same. Three individuals who choose to
spend $1 on a drink should be treated the same by the tax system, but in many countries with
special excise taxes, if the drinks chosen are a soft drink, coffee, and fruit juice, three different tax
treatments might result. The tax administration implications of this differential treatment also are
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important, because every complication increases the cost of effective administration and/or
reduces the probability of full compliance.

THE SPECIAL CASE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Most developing countries levy discriminatory excise taxes. Though the most common
targets are alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, petroleum, and motor vehicle related products
(tires and batteries), a number of developing countries include soft drinks in the list of
commodities subject to special excise taxes. In nearly all countries, the great majority of excise tax
revenue comes from the levies on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum products. Excises on soft
drinks, sugar, luxury items, etc., rarely account for significant amounts of revenue.
The discussion above on the lack of justification for special excises on soft drinks holds for
developing as well as for industrialized countries. Other than the case of goods whose
consumption and production imposes significant externalities, the case for discriminatory excises
is weak. Nevertheless, some developing countries face special circumstances that make excise
taxes appealing tax alternative. Such excises, if imposed, should cover a wide range of products
and industries and not discriminate among sectors except when warranted by externalities.
The first and most important reason claimed for heavy reliance on excises in less
developed countries is that tax administrations are weak (Cnossen, 1991). The general sales tax
(usually the VAT) is not broad-based and often covers only manufacturers, importers and large
distributors. Even on this narrow base, leakage through under-reporting and non-filing can be
significant. It is easy to see how manufacturing facilities become tax targets of governments in
such situations. Administration is easy by comparison with the alternatives of either VAT or
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income tax. There are relatively few producers, and tax assessment and collection can be based on
physical controls that do not require substantial book audit or record keeping activities.
Second, the revenue shortfall in developing countries may be tighter than in industrial
countries. Public services tend to be more inadequate, infrastructure more deficient, debt service
burdens higher, and there is little money available for new government programs. Developingcountry economies are usually more unstable and budget deficits tend to be higher, putting further
pressure on finding new revenue mobilization opportunities. In light of all of this, it is not
surprising that developing-country governments have expanded the list of goods subject to excise
taxes. Soft drinks are an easy target, and rate increases on excisables can quickly yield desired
increases in revenue. This is one reason why an increase in excise tax rates on alcohol, tobacco
and gasoline is a favorite proposal of international agencies when they offer tax policy and
revenue mobilization advice to developing country governments.
Third, skilled labor and capital often are scarce resources in developing countries. Too
scarce, some would argue, to be wasted on the production of luxury consumer goods. The better
route to economic growth is production with an export orientation. Discouraging the production
of consumer goods with a discriminatory tax might seem a reasonable way to achieve this
reallocation. And, if consumption choices are distorted, at least it is away from non-essential
consumption.
Finally, there is the “sin tax” justification. The consumption of cigarettes, liquor and motor
fuels produce external effects in developing countries just as they do in industrialized countries.
One might argue that the external costs are magnified in developing countries, as suggested by the
following examples:
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Roadways are already congested, and underpriced automobile usage imposes heavy costs
on the economy;
Pollution emissions are not controlled to the same extent as in industrialized countries,
hence the external cost per unit of motor vehicle use may be greater; and
Advertising the harmful effects of smoking and drinking is less pronounced in developing
countries, and “truth in advertising” restrictions may be less well enforced.
This list of reasons explains the popularity of excise taxes, and explains why governments in
some less developed countries have moved to include soft drinks in their excise tax regime. But
this does not mean that taxing soft drinks is good policy.

DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION OF SOFT DRINKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For industrialized countries, the case for discriminatory consumption taxes is even weaker.
Particularly in the case of taxing soft drinks, one could make the following arguments that
discriminatory taxes are not in the national interest, and should be reduced if not discontinued.
1. While specific excise taxes can be more easily administered than general sales taxes, in
developed countries the tax administration justification of excises is not persuasive. In
fact, protection of revenues with easily administered excise taxes, whose rate may be
increased with relatively little resistance, may slow efforts to bring about the needed
fundamental reform of tax administration systems. Rather than industry-specific
discriminatory taxes, countries should strive for a broad-based, neutral tax system.
2. It is not clear what should be included on the excise list. Where does one draw the line on
which products get discriminatory treatment? As countries mature in their economic
development and tax policy, they should limit the special excises to those goods whose
consumption produces large external effects. Otherwise, the hunt for new products to
include on the tax list becomes a judgmental process that is laden with arbitrariness. For
example, if soft drinks are taxed separately, then what about chocolate, ice cream, or just
about any other consumer good that comes along? And of the drink substitute products,
what about fruit juices, flavored milks, hot drinks and bottled waters? The more the tax
system creates classes of goods subject to special treatment, the more it drives up
administrative costs and thereby offsets its major advantage. A better way, especially in
countries where modern tax administration procedures are emerging, is to subject all
“non-externality” consumption to a general sales tax.
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3. Are discriminatory tax rates on soft drinks truly revenue productive? Evidence has shown
that the demand for soft drinks is price-elastic as there are good substitutes for soft drinks
available, e.g., water, tea, juices and milk. To the extent demand is price-elastic, increases
in the tax rate on soft drinks may result in more of a shift to consumption of lower-priced
substitutes and less of a net gain in revenues. The revenue productivity argument is
therefore less persuasive than many have supposed.
4. Is the tax on soft drinks really progressive? That is, do higher income families spend a
higher proportion of their income on soft drinks? If this is not the case, then the
discriminatory tax on soft drinks is proportional or even regressive, and public policy may
not be well served by the tax. There is need to study the issue of whether soft drinks are
consumed disproportionately by higher income families, so that the argument for taxing
soft drinks as an equity measure will not be based on impressionistic evidence.8
5. The production of soft drinks does use capital and skilled labor in the production of a
consumer good and thus competes with other sectors for investment resources. But this is
not a strong argument to discourage soft drink production versus other forms of consumer
goods production. The question is not whether the soft drink industry will use up
resources that otherwise might be used by export-oriented activities, it is whether the soft
drink industry adds more to the economy than do other sectors that produce for home
markets. Certainly a case can be made in this respect. The soft drink sector brings
significant benefits to the economy in the form of employment generation and often a high
domestic value added. It encourages expansion of domestic packaging industries,
strengthens the capacity to partner with exporters, and provides for the training of
workers in the bottling, packaging and distribution sectors.

CONCLUSIONS
The case for a discriminatory tax on soft drinks is very weak. At best the discriminatory
taxation of soft drinks is part of a “stopgap” program, usually designed to solve a short-term
revenue problem. However, continuation of discriminatory taxes may come at the expense of
future economic development. Clearly, such policies do not move developing countries toward
any fundamental solution to the fiscal imbalance that might exist. More advanced economies do

8

Bird (1992, page 22) points out that discriminatory taxation of consumer goods can be misleading if based on
impression. He cites the case of hair oil in the Philippines - an “obvious” luxury item - that turned out to be a basic
consumption item of the lowest income groups.
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not have to settle for such “stopgap” measures. Discriminatory excises, other than on the “sin”
products, find little justification in modern tax systems. In fact, discriminatory taxes on soft
drinks have been eliminated in most European countries and are often in the process of being
phased-out in others. A middle or higher income country that resorts to imposing differential,
discriminatory excises on consumption of specified products, is taking a step back in the
modernization of their fiscal system and probably postponing a more proper reform that would be
in the better interest of the country.
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